Law & Humanities Blog |
- Call For Papers
- Fighting It Out In a Seventeenth Century Literary Venue
- Distinctions Between Construction and Interpretation
- Categorizing Approaches To Law and Culture
- Law, Literature, and the Media
- A New Journal Devoted To Christopher Marlowe
| Posted: 29 Jun 2011 11:38 AM PDT From Robert L. Tsai, Professor of Law, American University, Washington College of Law CALL FOR PAPERS   |
| Fighting It Out In a Seventeenth Century Literary Venue Posted: 29 Jun 2011 08:58 AM PDT José Calvo González, University of Málaga Faculty of Law, has published Quevedo en tela de juicio, o sea El Tribvnal de la ivsta vengança de Luis Pacheco de Narváez. (De contiendas literarias y Derecho en la España del s. XVII), 525 in Estudios Jurídicos en Homenaje al Profesor Alejandro Guzmán Brito, volume 1 (Patricio-Ignacio Carvajal and Massimo Miglietta eds; Edizioni dell'Orso, Alessandria, 2011). Here is the abstract. The paper examines the "procedural drama" created by Luis Pacheco de Narváez (1570 - 1640) in his Tribunal de la justa venganza [Court the just vengeance] (1635) for the prosecution of literary aesthetics (and moral ideas and values) Quevedo´s [Francisco de Quevedo y Villegas (1580-1645)].The uniqueness of the case in the frequent literary controversies of the time lies in the nature of judicial inquiry that was built. In this legal-procedural dimension reprimanded experiencing a profound rethinking of the semantic roles in the "production of sens" between Law and Literature/ Literature and Law. The essay is also available online at the Italian Society for Law and Literature (ISLL) website.   |
| Distinctions Between Construction and Interpretation Posted: 29 Jun 2011 08:41 AM PDT Lawrence B. Solum, Georgetown Law School, has published The Interpretation-Construction Distinction at 27 Constitutional Commentary 95 (2010). Here is the abstract. The interpretation-construction distinction, which marks the difference between linguistic meaning and legal effect, is much discussed these days. |
I shall argue that the distinction is both real and fundamental – that it marks a deep difference in two different stages (or moments) in the way that legal and political actors process legal texts. My account of the distinction will not be precisely the same as some others, but I shall argue that it is the correct account and captures the essential insights of its rivals. This Essay aims to mark the distinction clearly!
The basic idea can be explained by distinguishing two different moments or stages that occur when an authoritative legal text (a constitution, statute, regulation, or rule) is applied or explicated. The first of these moments is interpretation – which I shall stipulate is the process (or activity) that recognizes or discovers the linguistic meaning or semantic content of the legal text. The second moment is construction – which I shall stipulate is the process that gives a text legal effect (either my translating the linguistic meaning into legal doctrine or by applying or implementing the text). I shall then claim that the difference between interpretation and construction is real and fundamental. Although the terminology (the words "interpretation" and "construction" that express the distinction) could vary, legal theorists cannot do without the distinction.
One more preliminary point: the topic of this Essay is narrow and conceptual. This Essay, has three goals: (1) to explicate the nature of the interpretation-construction distinction, (2) to argue that this distinction marks a real difference, and (3) to suggest that the distinction is helpful in that it enables legal theorists to clarify the nature of important debates, for example debates about constitutional interpretation. The Essay does not offer any particular theory of interpretation or construction – that it is, it remains agnostic about questions as to how linguistic meaning can be discerned or how legal content ought to be determined. Nor does this theory offer an account of the history and origins of the distinction. Those topics are important, but raising them in this Essay might shift attention away from prior questions about the nature and value of the distinction itself.
Here is the roadmap. In Part II, this Essay shall discuss two preliminary sets of ideas: (1) vagueness and ambiguity, and (2) semantic content and legal content. In Part III, this Essay shall use these preliminary ideas to answer the questions, "What is interpretation?" and "What is construction?" In Part IV, this Essay shall consider some objections to the interpretation-construction distinction. In Part V, this Essay shall develop the argument that the distinction is fundamental and indispensable.Download the article from SSRN at the link.
The basic idea can be explained by distinguishing two different moments or stages that occur when an authoritative legal text (a constitution, statute, regulation, or rule) is applied or explicated. The first of these moments is interpretation – which I shall stipulate is the process (or activity) that recognizes or discovers the linguistic meaning or semantic content of the legal text. The second moment is construction – which I shall stipulate is the process that gives a text legal effect (either my translating the linguistic meaning into legal doctrine or by applying or implementing the text). I shall then claim that the difference between interpretation and construction is real and fundamental. Although the terminology (the words "interpretation" and "construction" that express the distinction) could vary, legal theorists cannot do without the distinction.
One more preliminary point: the topic of this Essay is narrow and conceptual. This Essay, has three goals: (1) to explicate the nature of the interpretation-construction distinction, (2) to argue that this distinction marks a real difference, and (3) to suggest that the distinction is helpful in that it enables legal theorists to clarify the nature of important debates, for example debates about constitutional interpretation. The Essay does not offer any particular theory of interpretation or construction – that it is, it remains agnostic about questions as to how linguistic meaning can be discerned or how legal content ought to be determined. Nor does this theory offer an account of the history and origins of the distinction. Those topics are important, but raising them in this Essay might shift attention away from prior questions about the nature and value of the distinction itself.
Here is the roadmap. In Part II, this Essay shall discuss two preliminary sets of ideas: (1) vagueness and ambiguity, and (2) semantic content and legal content. In Part III, this Essay shall use these preliminary ideas to answer the questions, "What is interpretation?" and "What is construction?" In Part IV, this Essay shall consider some objections to the interpretation-construction distinction. In Part V, this Essay shall develop the argument that the distinction is fundamental and indispensable.Download the article from SSRN at the link.
Categorizing Approaches To Law and Culture
Posted: 29 Jun 2011 08:38 AM PDT
Menachem Mautner, Buchmann Faculty of Law, Tel Aviv University, has published Three Approaches to Law and Culture at 96 Cornell Law Review 839 (2011). Here is the abstract.
This article discusses three major approaches connecting culture to law. The first is the historical school that arose in German jurisprudence in the first half of the nineteenth century. It views law as a product of a nation's culture and as embedded in the daily practices of its people. The second approach is the constitutive approach that developed in American jurisprudence in the 1980s. This approach views law as participating in the constitution of culture and thereby in the constitution of people's minds, practices, and social relations. The third approach, found in twentieth-century Anglo-American jurisprudence, views the law that the courts create and apply as a distinct cultural system. Law practitioners internalize this culture in the course of their studies and professional activity, and this internalization comes to constitute, direct, and delimit the way these practitioners think, argue, resolve cases, and provide justifications. The writings of Karl Llewellyn, James Boyd White, Pierre Bourdieu and Stanley Fish are discussed. Beyond these three approaches the article points out nine additional approaches in legal scholarship concerning the relationship between law and culture. This mapping is tentative. It is hoped, however, that it gives readers a preliminary idea of the widespread use of the concept of culture in the law and that it invites further reflection on other possible ways to employ the concept of culture in legal scholarship for a richer understanding of the legal phenomenon.The full text is not available from SSRN.
Law, Literature, and the Media
Posted: 29 Jun 2011 08:36 AM PDT
Maria Francisca Carneiro, Federal University of Paraná, and Maria Fernanda Loureiro have published Law, Literature and the Media. Here is the abstract.
In this article we consider the relation between Law and Literature. The possibility of investigating literary elements of Law implicit in popular culture leads us to inquire whether the media can also be an object of studies of juridical literature.Download the paper from SSRN at the link.
A New Journal Devoted To Christopher Marlowe
Posted: 29 Jun 2011 08:29 AM PDT
From the Chronicle of Higher Education: A new journal on Christopher Marlowe is making its debut. Indiana University/Purdue University, Fort Wayne is publishing Marlowe Studies as an annual.
In the first issue:
Meghan C. Andrews, University of Texas, Austin, "The 1663 Doctor Faustus and the Royalist Marlowe"
James Biester, Loyola University of Chicago, "A Storm Brewing: Inspirations for The Tempest in Marlowe and Jonson"
Bruce Brandt, South Dakota State University, "A Decade Bibliography of Christopher Marlowe, 2000-2009"
Douglas Bruster, University of Texas, Austin, "Christopher Marlowe and the Verse / Prose Bilingual System"
Sara Munson Deats, University of South Florida, "Mars or Gorgon? Tamburlaine and Henry V"
R. Carter Hailey, College of William and Mary, "The Publication Date of Marlowe's Massacre at Paris, with a Note on the Massacre Manuscript Leaf, Folger J.b.8"
Lisa Hopkins, Sheffield Hallam University, "Playing with Matches: Christopher Marlowe's Incendiary Imagination"
Jeremy Lopez, University of Toronto, "Alleyn Resurrected"
Paul Menzer, Mary Baldwin College, "Shades of Marlowe"
Barbara Parker, William Paterson University, "'Cursèd Necromancy': Marlowe's Faustus as Anti-Catholic Satire"
Jeffrey Rufo, Trinity University, "Marlowe's Minions: Sodomitical Politics in Edward II and The Massacre at Paris"
In the first issue:
Meghan C. Andrews, University of Texas, Austin, "The 1663 Doctor Faustus and the Royalist Marlowe"
James Biester, Loyola University of Chicago, "A Storm Brewing: Inspirations for The Tempest in Marlowe and Jonson"
Bruce Brandt, South Dakota State University, "A Decade Bibliography of Christopher Marlowe, 2000-2009"
Douglas Bruster, University of Texas, Austin, "Christopher Marlowe and the Verse / Prose Bilingual System"
Sara Munson Deats, University of South Florida, "Mars or Gorgon? Tamburlaine and Henry V"
R. Carter Hailey, College of William and Mary, "The Publication Date of Marlowe's Massacre at Paris, with a Note on the Massacre Manuscript Leaf, Folger J.b.8"
Lisa Hopkins, Sheffield Hallam University, "Playing with Matches: Christopher Marlowe's Incendiary Imagination"
Jeremy Lopez, University of Toronto, "Alleyn Resurrected"
Paul Menzer, Mary Baldwin College, "Shades of Marlowe"
Barbara Parker, William Paterson University, "'Cursèd Necromancy': Marlowe's Faustus as Anti-Catholic Satire"
Jeffrey Rufo, Trinity University, "Marlowe's Minions: Sodomitical Politics in Edward II and The Massacre at Paris"
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